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CHAPTER 4 
Partnerships and Corporations 
RICHARD M. GABERMAN 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§4.1. Partnerships: What constitutes creditor or partner. A partner-
ship, according to the General Laws, is "an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 1 While this 
statement is theoretically clear, the courts occasionally encounter an 
instrument which is not a partnership agreement in express terms, but 
which nevertheless shares the essential characteristics of a partnership. 
The Supreme Judicial Court was asked to interpret such an instrument 
in Shin berg v. Garfinkle.2 
The Shinberg case arose on a bill in equity to compel an accounting 
on a financing agreement. Defendant had agreed with two other parties 
that each would invest $25,000 in a real estate trust and receive one-third 
of the transferable trust certificates in return. To obtain the required 
capital, defendant entered into a separate financing agreement which 
provided that plaintiff, a personal friend, would advance the defendant 
$25,000. In return, defendant agreed to pay over to the plaintiff all of 
his proceeds from the trust until the loan was repaid in full, and there-
after to share all of his profits equally with the plaintiff. Nineteen months 
later, through a series of misrepresentations, the defendant induced plain-
tiff to sell out his interest in the venture for $30,500.3 Shortly thereafter, 
the trust generated a profit of $87,852.26 for each of the three original 
investors, and plaintiff brought this action to recover one-half of the 
defendant's share as lost profits. 
Plaintiff argued that the financing agreement constituted a partnership 
which imposed a fiduciary duty on the defendant. The essential elements 
of partnership include (1) carrying on a business for profit;4 (2) sharing 
profits and losses;5 (3) joint control of the enterprise;6 and (4) the intent 
RICHARD M. GABERMAN is in private practice in Springfield. 
§4.1. 1 G.L., c. lOBA, §6 ( 1 ). 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 239, 278 N.E.2d 738. 
3 The defendant misrePresented to the plaintiff that (1) the real estate which 
was the subject matter of the original agreement was not for sale, (2) the de-
fendant had not received funds from the trust, and (3) cemficates had not been 
issued to the defendant. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 239, 245, 278 N.E.2d 738, 742. 
4 G.L., c. 10BA, §6(1) .. 
5 Id at §§7(4), 18(a). Few jurisdictions emphasize the sharing of losses as 
evidence of the existence of a partnership since persons entering· into an informal 
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to form a partnership.7 Joint contribution to capital is not an essential 
element, and indeed one partner may finance an entire venture.8 The 
General Laws further provide that receipt of a share of the profits from 
a business is prima facie evidence of partnership except that "no such 
inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment: (a) 
of a debt by installments or otherwise, ... "9 
Applying these principles to the facts in Shinberg, the Court held that 
the financing agreement did not provide a basis for a partnership. The 
key factors in that determination were: (1) the financing agreement did 
not describe itself as a partnership despite its use of the terms "partners" 
and "joint venturers" to describe the original investors; (2) the agreement 
related to "a single, limited investment by the [plaintiff], rather than the 
joint conduct of a continuing business;" and (3) plaintiff and defendant 
"were not associated 'to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,' 
particularly prior to the repayment of [the] advance of $25,000."10 
(Emphasis added). Since the advance had not been fully repaid to 
Shinberg, the third factor above raises an implication that a partnership 
might have existed after complete repayment. It is uncertain whether 
the Court intended such an implication to arise. The Court added further 
uncertainty since it consistently described the financing arrangement as 
an investment or an advance rather than using the word debt which 
appears in the statute quoted above. 
Shinberg illustrates that the line between partnership on the one hand, 
and the debtor-creditor relationship on the other, remains ill-defined. 
Creditors often obtain control over an enterprise as security for a loan. 
The plaintiff, Shinberg, did in fact obtain some control over the defen-
dant's investment including the right to receive copies of all trust records 
including disbursements.l1 G.L., c. 108A, §16 is particularly troublesome 
for a creditor since it provides in part: 
When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents 
himself, or consents to another representing him to anyone, as a 
partner . . . with one or more persons not actual partners, he is 
liable to any such person to whom such representation has been 
made . . . and if he has made such representation or consented to 
its being made in a public manner he is liable to such person, whether 
business relationship usually do not contemplate losses. An exception is Iowa. 
See Anderson v. Walter, 256 Iowa 1324, 131 N.W. 2d 524 (1964). The agree-
ment in the Shinberg case did, however, contain a provision as to losses. 
6 G.L., c. 108A, §l8(e). 
7 See Mitchell v. Gruener, 251 Mass. 113, 123, 146 N.E. 252,255 (1925). 
S Implicit in G.L., c. 108A, 118(a). See also Whitley v. Bradley, 13 Cal'. App. 
720,729, 110 P. 596, 599, (1910). 
9 G.L., c. 108A, 17(4) (a). 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 239, 243, 278 N.E.2d 738, 741. 
11 Id. at 240 n. 3, 278 N.E.2d at 739-40 n. 3. 
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the representation has or has not been made or communicated to 
such person giving credit .... (Emphasis added). 
While the controls provided in the Shinberg agreement were passive in 
nature, the exercise of active controls in other cases might well give rise 
to partnership liability.12 G.L., c. 108A, §7 (4) (a) attempts to minimize 
this problem by providing that the mere receipt of a share of profits 
shall not be prima facie evidence of partnership in a debtor-creditor 
context.13 However, there is no protection in cases where the creditor's 
exercise of control would constitute conduct exposing him to liability 
by representation,14 or where the existence of the control itself amounts 
to a partnership under Section 6 ( 1) of Chapter 108A. The fact is that 
creditors venture on precarious ground when they accept extensive con-
trols as security for the debts of a business enterprise.15 
§4.2. Corporations: Competition by former officers, confidential in-
formation; fiduciary relationship. Corporate officers frequenty engage 
in direct competition with their former corporate employer after termina-
tion of employment. The problem for the corporation is particularly 
acute where the employment contract with the former officers did not 
contain a covenant not to compete. Such was the case in Berkshire Ap-
parel Corp. v Stogez.t 
Berkshire was in the business of manufacturing half-size dresses. In 
Berkshire the corporate employer sought to enjoin former key employees 
from entering a competitive business. The Supreme Judicial Court denied 
an injunction since "there was at no time any agreement between the 
[parties] restricting their activities upon termination of employment."2 
Berkshire also argued that its former employees were unlawfully using 
trade secrets or confidential information gained through their prior 
12 But see Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927). In that case, 
lenders had loaned a partnership $2,500,000 in return for which they were to 
receive forty percent of the fil'I!l's profits. The lenders also had the rights to be 
advised as to all business, to inspect the firm's records, to be consulted on im-
portant matters, .to veto any business transaction, and to retain other substantial 
controls. The court, however, held that the lenders were not liabl'e for the debts 
of the firm. Also cf. CuIIingworth v. Pollard, 201 Va. 498, 111 S.E.2d 810 (1960), 
on the question of the degree of control necessary to create partnership liability. 
13 See text accompanying n. 9 supra. 
14 G.L., c. 108A, §16(1). See, e.g., Century Indemnity Co. v. Bloom, 329 Mass. 
508, 109 N.E.2d 166 (1953) (liability of ostensible partner to third party). 
But d., cases cited in n. 12 supra. 
15 For cases involving situations similar to that in the Shinberg case, see e.g. 
CuIIingworth v. PoIl'ard, 201 Va. 498, 111 S.E.2d 810 (1960), Dills v. Dilera 
Corp., 145 Cal. App.2d 124, 302 P.2d 397 (1956), and Virginia Hotel Co. v. 
Dusenberry, 218 S.C. 524, 63 S.E.2d 483 (1951). 
§4.2. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1878,277 N.E.2d 310 (rescript decision). 
2 Id., 277 N.E.2d at 311. 
3
Gaberman: Chapter 4: Partnerships and Corporations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
64 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §4.2 
employment,3 but this argument was rejected because the plaintiffs failed 
to prove such confidentiality.". 
Had Berkshire satisfied its burden of proving the disclosure of con-
fidential information, the Court might have ordered the relief sought 
since it has upheld such injunctions in the past even in the absence of 
an agreement. In New England Overall Co., Inc. v. Woltmann,5 a case 
factually similar to Berkshire, the Court upheld an injunction forbidding 
a former employee from soliciting or communicating with the plaintiff's 
customers. The defendant was the former sales manager of the plaintiff-
corporation and he had been privy to confidential information about the 
plaintiff's customers. The Court did not rest its decision upon the existence 
or nonexistence of a restrictive covenant, but followed the position taken 
in Section 396 of the Restatement of Agency, which it quoted with 
approval: 
Unless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency, the 
agent: (a) has no duty not to compete with the principal;6 (b) has a 
duty ... not to use or to disclose ... in competition with the princi-
pal or to his injury, trade secrets .. . or other confidential matters 
[obtained from prior employment].7 (Emphasis added). 
In the absence of a trade secret or a covenant not to compete, cor-
porations have frequently contended that a fiduciary relationship pre-
cludes former officers from entering a competitive business. The fiduciary 
relationship argument has been particularly effective in cases involving 
the doctrine of "corporate opportunity," but those cases generally involve 
an officer or director who takes advantage of inside knowledge while he 
is still associated with the employer.s However, the rule in the absence 
of corporate opportunity was clearly defined in Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. 
Grant:9 
3 One has a property right in a secret manufacturing process, whether or not 
patentable, and a person who violates that right by applying the process to his 
own use or disclosing it to third persons in breach of trust and confidence may 
be enjoined from such action. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868), and 
Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 13'1 
N.E.307 (1921). 
4 The Court accepted the findings of the trial judge that "the defendants re-
turned aU useful records and data to the plaintiffs soon after dismissal, and that 
the 'intangible' knowledge and skill acquired by the defendants while employed 
by the plaintiffs did not constitute trade secrets or confidential information sub-
ject to any implied or ~press understanding that it would not become part of 
the ~perience that the defendants could take with them and use if their em-
ployment with the plaintiffs should end." 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1878, 277 N.E.2d 
310,311. 
. 5 343 Mass. 69, 176 N.E:2d 193 (1961). 
6 See also Di Angeles v. Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 191 N.E. 426 (1934); 
Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941). 
7 343 Mass. at 76, 176 N.E.2d at 198. 
8 Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948). 
9309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941). 
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With respect to his first contention, plaintiff argued that the words 
"any other papers" in the corporate resolution included such instruments 
as the option agreement in question.9 The defendant argued that the 
reasonable interpretation of the board vote was that the president was 
authorized to execute a deed and only such other instruments as were 
necessary to complete the conveyance which was the subject matter of 
the vote,l° While the argument does not appear to have been advanced, 
it is interesting to conjecture whether the plaintiff would have satisfied 
his burden of proving actual authority had he shown that he would not 
have entered into the purchase and sale agreement but for the option 
provision which it contained. It would certainly be arguable under such 
circumstances that the option was "needed to effectuate [the] transfer." 
Yet it is doubtful that the Court would have found this argument con-
vincing, especially since "'an agent is not authorized to do acts not 
incidental to the transaction, not usually done in connection with it or 
not reasonably necessary.' "11 Needless to say, the execution of an option 
agreement is not incidental to the execution of a deed. 
The Court agreed with the defendant's strict reading of the corporate 
resolution at issue: 
Since the authorizing instrument was the result of formal corporate 
action taken at a duly called meeting of the corporation's board of 
directors, the instrument "can be assumed to spell out the intent of 
the principal accurately with a high degree of particularity .... [S]ince 
such instruments are ordinarily very carefully drawn and scrutinized 
... it is assumed that the document represents the entire under-
standing of the parties."12 (Court's brackets). 
It might be questioned whether the Court's assumption is well-founded. 
It is the experience of this author that where a small corporation is in-
volved, resolutions of the kind at issue in Lucey are frequently prepared 
without the benefit of a formal directors' meeting and often lack that 
degree of draftsmenship and scrutiny to which the Court alludes. Yet 
from a practical point of view, the Lucey decision points out the im-
portance of a carefully drawn corporate resolution. 
In rejecting the plaintiff's second argument regarding apparent author-
ity, the Court relied on Kelly v. Citizens Finance Co. of Lowell, Inc. 13 
where it first announced the limits of a corporate officer's power to bind 
the corporation: 
The authority to manage the business affairs of a corporation is 
9 Brief for the Petitioner, p. 4. 
10 Brief for the Respondent, p. 7. 
11 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 743, 746, 281 N.E.2d 266, 269, quoting Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency §35, Comment a (1958). 
12 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 743, 746, 281 N.E.2d 266, 269, quoting Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency §34, Comment h (1958). 
13 306 Mass. 531, 28 N.E.2d 1005 (1940). 
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primarily vested in its board of directors. Its president ... [has] little 
or no inherent power to bind the corporation outside of a com-
paratively narrow circle of functions specially pertaining to [his 
office]. ... 
In the cases in this Commonwealth in which a president . . . has 
been held to have general authority to make contracts it will be 
found that such authority has been delegated to him either expressly, 
by means of some by-law or vote of the directors relative to the 
matter in question or granting to the officer the powers of a general 
manager, or impliedly by reason of his continued exercise of similar 
powers in such a matter that knowledge and approval of the direc-
tors or of a majority of them can reasonably be inferred,14 
By virtue of his office alone, the defendant's president had no apparent 
or implied power to enter into the option agreement. 
In the absence of actual or apparent authority, the acts of a corporate 
officer may still bind the corporation if they are subsequently ratified 
by the board of directors. 15 There was no evidence of express ratification 
in Lucey.16 Although the acts of an officer may also be ratified by im-
plication, such ratification "imports a full knowledge of all the essential 
facts."17 
It is also true that where a majority of a board of directors of a 
corporation participate in the doing of a corporate act within their 
powers and the other directQTs have knowledge of and adopt it by 
acquiescence or otherwise the corporation is bound by their action, 
and this without a formal meeting and vote of the board . . . but 
this does not mean that a majority may bind the corporation by an 
act required to be performed by the directors where the other mem-
bers of the board have no knowledge of the transaction at the time 
it is entered into, and do not subsequently adopt it either expressly 
or impliedly, .. ,18 (Emphasis added). 
However, there was no finding of "full knowledge" in Lucey. 
While the matter was not raised by the plaintiff, one might speculate 
whether there was an annual stockholders' meeting, subsequent to the 
directors' vote in question, at which a resolution was adopted generally 
ratifying the acts of the officers and directors of the corporation for the 
past year. Such a "boiler plate" resolution is not uncommon at such 
meetings and arguably would constitute the kind of express ratification 
required to bind the corporation. In the case of Winchell v. Plywood 
14 Id. at 532-33, 28 N.E.2d at 1006. 
15 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 743, 745, 281 N.E.2d 266, 268. 
16 Id. 
17 James F. Monaghan, Inc. v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, 290 Mass. 331, 334-35, 
195 N.E. 101, 102 (1935), and cases cited therein. 
18 Hurley v. Omsteen, 311 Mass. 477, 480-81, 42 N.E.2d 273, 275-76 (1942). 
See also cases cited in 13A Mass. Practice Series 231 n. 66. But see Eldelstone 
v. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co., 84 N.H. 315, 321, 150 A. 545, 548 (1930). 
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Directors or officers of a corporation are not, by reason of the 
fiduciary relationship they bear toward the corporation, necessarily 
precluded from entering into an independent business in competition 
with it, but, in doing so, they must act in good faith. 1O (Emphasis 
added). 
Although the Court has not elaborated on its concept of good faith,u 
the fiduciary duty is strictly limited. 
§4.3. Informal compensation agreements. In small companies which 
are essentially incorporated partnerships, the stockholder-employees 
often elect to continue receiving salaries on a profit sharing basis rather 
than under a fixed compensation contract. Petruzzi v. Peduka Construc-
tion, Inc. l involved such an arrangement. 
The plaintiff in Petruzzi worked in partnership with another individual 
until they joined with a third person to form a corporation. Although 
the facts recited in the decision are somewhat unclear, there was ap-
parently an informal agreement among the three to share profits. How-
ever, the understanding was never reduced to writing nor reflected in 
the corporate minutes of the directors. The plaintiff was later voted out 
of his position as an officer and director by the other stockholder-directors, 
each of whom held a one-third interest in the business. The plaintiff 
then formed a competitive business and sued the corporation for his 
share of the prior year's profits. The Court held that "[i]t was not 
necessary that a formal vote be taken [by the directors] to bind the cor-
poration [to a compensation arrangement]."2 Indeed, the Court suggested 
in an earlier decision that even in the absence of an express agreement 
a plaintiff may still be entitled to compensation if his "services were of 
benefit to the defendant and were accepted under such circumstances 
that the ... directors must reasonably have understood that they were 
not gratuitous."3 Because of the nature of a small corporation-its 
informal operation and sharing of profits as if a partnership-,--the Court 
has recognized that such businesses frequently operate under informal, 
and often vague, compensation arrangements. 
10 Id. at 423, 34 N.E.2d at 707. 
11 Compare Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954), 
where the court held that fonner employees were liable to their fonner employer 
based on a breach of fiduciary duty by "conspiring upon a course of conduct 
while in plaintiff's employ to fonn the new agency and take over its accounts," 
with Di Angeles v. Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 191 N.E. 426 (1934), where the 
Court found no liability although the defendant solicited customers of his 
fonner employer. See also American Window Cleaning Co. of Springfield v. 
Cohen, 343 Mass. 195, 178 N.E.2d 5 (1961). 
B.3. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1267, 285 N.E.2d 101. 
2 Id. at 1269, 285 N.E.2d at 102. See aliso Uccello v. Gold'n Foods, Inc., 
325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950), holding that it is not essential that 
salary be shown by fonnal votes recorded in the corporate records. 
3 Fisk v. New England Tire & Supply Co., 244 Mass. 364, 374, 138 N.E. 
901, 905 (1923). 
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There have been exceptions to the Court's liberal approach to the 
compensation issue. In Beacon Wool CO'rp. v. Johnson4 the Court denied 
the plaintiff additional compensation in the form of bonuses even though 
they had been paid in the four preceding years. Two facts were deter-
minative in the Court's opinion: (1) there was no agreement, express 
or implied, for the additional compensation, and (2) the corporation was 
in a precarious financial situation and the payment of bonuses under such 
circumstances would have constituted a misuse of funds which violated 
the directors' duty of good faith. 
§4.4. Authority of corporate officers to enter real estate agreements: 
Lucey v. Hero International Corp.! On February 15, 1969 the plaintiff 
placed an offer to purchase a five acre parcel of defendant-corporation's 
land with a real estate broker who claimed to represent the defendant's 
president.2 The real estate agreement prepared in connection with the 
offer contained an option to purchase additional land at $1,000 per acre, 
but this contract was never executed. Three weeks later, the defendant's 
board of directors voted to sell the five acre parcel, and it authorized 
the president" 'to sign the deed and any other papers needed to effectuate 
this transfer.'''3 (Emphasis added). At a subsequent closing, the plaintiff 
executed a second real estate sales agreement containing an option to 
purchase additional land at $1,000 per acre. Defendant's president later 
signed the agreement after he and the defendant's attorneys had made 
certain changes which were assented to by the plaintiff,4 but he did not 
consult the other officers. Plaintiff later sought to enforce the option and 
a decree of specific performance was granted in superior court. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed because the master's findings were in-
sufficient to support any of the plaintiff's three basic arguments,5 namely: 
(1) that the vote of the directors conferred actual authority to enter the 
option agreement,6 (2) that the president had apparent authority to 
grant the option,' and (3) that the corporation ratified the unauthorized 
act.s 
4 331 Mass. 274, 119 N.E.2d 195 (1954). 
§4.4. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 743, 281 N.E.2d 266. 
2 The plaintiff had no knowledge of the involvement of the defendant-
corporation at this stage of the negotiations. Id. at 743, 281 N.E.2d at 267. 
3 Id. at 744, 281 N.E.2d at 267. 
4 The final version granted the plaintiff "an option to purchase additional 
land belonging to [the defendant] as mutually agre.ed upon by both parties." 
The defendant's attorney had added the clause "as mutually agreed upon by 
both parties," and the president deleted a clause referring to specific land. Id. 
at 744, 281 N.E.2d at 268. 
5 Id. at 746, 281 N.E.2d at 269. The Court also found that the option agree· 
ment was too indefinite to be specifically enforced since it referred to the 
purchase of additional land "as mutually agreed upon by both parties." (Court's 
emphasis). Id. at 747, 281 Mass. at 270. 
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Corp.,19 the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that the adoption of such 
a resolution by the directors of the defendant-corporation at their annual 
meeting could constitute an express ratification of the unauthorized act 
of the corporation's president in entering into a stock repurchase option 
contract. The Court in Winchell emphasized that all the directors of 
the defendant had knowledge of the contract in question, and they were 
all present at the annual meeting at which the boiler plate resolution was 
adopted.20 It would thus appear that the question of knowledge is central 
to the issue of ratification, both express and implied. 
§4.5. Liability of individual corporate officers for negligence or non-
feasance. Almost a half century ago the Supreme Judicial Court held 
in the case of Tibbetts v. Wentworth,1 that a corporate officer is not 
personally liable for nonfeasance to anyone but his employer. In Leavitt 
v. Glick Realty Corp.,2 the Court this year revitalized that ruling to 
exonerate corporate officers where there was no proof of affirmative 
negligence, leaving only the corporation to be held liable. 
The facts in Tibbetts and L~avitt were remarkably similar. The de-
fendant in Tibbetts was president and treasurer of a corporation which 
controlled a commercial building containing an elevator. The defendant 
gave orders to provide for inspection and maintenance of the elevators. 
Plaintiff was injured by the cable of an elevator which was out of repair, 
but there was no evidence that the defendant knew of the dangerous 
condition. The defendants in Leavitt were the president, treasurer and 
clerk respectively of a corporation which owned and operated apartment 
buildings. They had given orders to an electrical contractor to do any 
electrical work that needed to be done in the buildings, no questions 
asked. Plaintiff's decedent died in a fire which resulted from an over-
loaded electrical system. The Leavitt Court quoted from the Tibbetts 
opinion to indicate the standards for individual liability: 
'There was no evidence to show that any act by [the individual de-
fendant] in person in any way contributed to the injury. He had no 
connection with the premises except as agent for some other person 
.... He was an officer of [the company] and as such took care of 
repairs. He gave orders for the care of the elevator. There is no 
evidence of anything more. No knowledge of failure to perform what 
he ordered .... No negligence of ... any kind by him is shown .... 
[TJhe negligence in failing to inspect or repair the elevator . . . was 
of another person to whom [the company] and not [the individual 
19 324 Mass. 171, 85 N.E.2d 313 (1949). 
20 Id. at 175, 85 N.E.2d at 316. For cases holding that such resolutions are 
ineffective as ratifications of acts not disclosed to the ,stockholders, see, e.g., 
Hyams v. Old Dominion Co., 113 Me. 294, 93 A. 747 (1915), General Invest-
ment Co. v. American Hide and Leather Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 230, 127 A. 659 
(1925). 
H.5. 1 248 Mass. 468, 143 N.E. 349 (1924). 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1489, 285 N.E.2d 786. 
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defendant] stood in the position of superior. The servant of [the com-
pany], and not the seTVIant of [the individual defendant] was the 
negligent person.'3 (Emphasis added). 
Both decisions relate primarily to the standard of exoneration rather 
than the test for determining affirmative liability. Nevertheless, they 
refer to three key concepts which might furnish some basis for liability 
in other circumstances: ( 1) contribution to the injury, (2) knowledge 
of the dangerous condition, and (3) personal negligence in some form. 
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is implicit in 
Leavitt and Tibbetts, and it has been used on other occasions as the 
fundamental test of individual liability. In Buck v. Clauson's Inn at 
Coonamessett, Inc.4 the individual defendant was the president of a 
corporation which operated a golf course. Plaintiff was injured when she 
fell into a three foot deep hole which was located within three feet of 
the fairway. The individual defendant had known of the hole and took 
no precautions to protect spectators. He authorized advertising for the 
match and expected that spectators would be all over the golf course 
during the match. The trial court directed a verdict for the individual 
defendant, and the Supreme Judicial Court sustained the directed verdict 
on appeal: 
The evidence did not warrant the conclusion that he had directly 
participated in the accident or that he individually had been guilty 
of any negligent misfeasance (as contrasted with nonfeasance) 
causing injury to the female plaintiff.5 (Emphasis added). 
It thus appears that knowledge alone will not impose liability on a 
corporate officer. 
On the other hand, actual participation in a negligent act, with full 
knowledge of the danger to third persons, will not be excused on the 
ground that the participant was acting in his capacity as a servant of 
the corporation, whether or not he was following corporate instructions. 
In Corliss v. Keown,6 the individual defendants were the president and 
treasurer of a corporation respectively, and the president loaned his 
horse and carriage to the treasurer to take money to the bank on the 
company's behalf. The horse was an unsafe and dangerous animaI,7 and 
the trial court found that both of the defendants were aware of the 
danger. The horse ran away, and it struck and injured the plaintiff as 
she was crossing a public street in Lynn. The Supreme Judicial Court 
3 Id. at 1491-92, 285 N.E.2d at 788, quoting 248 Mass. at 472-73, 143 
N.E. at 350. 
4349 Mass. 612, 211 N.E.2d 349 (1965). 
5 Id. at 614-15, 211 N.E.2d at 351. 
6 207 Mass. 149, 93 N.E. 143 (1910). 
7 .. 'By reason of the disposition to start suddenly, she was an unsafe animal 
to drive in a public place such as the square where the accident in this case 
occurred, and of this both defendants had knowledge.'" Id. at 151, 93 N.E. 
at 144, quoting from the findings of the trial judge. 
10
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ruled: "[I]t was negligent for her to actively participate in this use of 
the horse by taking the business in charge and directing it with full 
knowledge of its negligent character."8 (Emphasis added). 
§4.6. Liability of corporations for civil contempt. The Supreme 
Judicial Court held in United Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Jay's Stores, Inc.! 
that "(a) good faith, (b) absence of wilful disobedience, and (c) lack 
of intent to violate a decree do not constitute a valid defense for a cor-
poration charged with civil contempt."2 The Court, however, left the 
clear implication that in cases involving individuals charged with civil 
contempt, wilful disobedience must be established.s 
The defendant in United Factory Outlet had been preliminarily en-
joined from using the words "Mammoth Mart" in connection with any 
store or business owned by it. The defendant admittedly used those 
words in an advertisement but argued that contempt required wilful 
disobedience or intention to violate the decree. Plaintiff responded that 
wilfulness or intent would be impossible to prove where the alleged 
contemnor was a corporation, and the Court held that proof of the pro-
hibited the act would be sufficient. The Court also said that it would not 
"absolve a large or small corporate defendant from its responsibilities 
simply because the corporation has ordered compliance but has not 
sufficiently policed same:'4 particularly when the corporation stands to 
benefit from the violation of the decree.5 (Court's emphasis). Proof that 
the corporation was acting in good faith may, however, be considered 
in mitigation of the offense.G 
§4.7. Corporate criminal liability. Criminal acts are not usually 
made the subject of votes of authorization or ratification by corporate 
boards of directors, and in a large and complex corporate structure, 
evidence of such authorization or ratification is easily concealed, even 
where it does exist. As the Supreme Judicial Court recently noted, the 
criminal acts themselves "are not performed within the glare of pub-
licity .... "1 Moreover, large, complex corporations by necessity must 
8 Id. at 151-52, 93 N.E. at 144. 
H.6. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 159, 278 N.E.2d 716. 
2 Id. at 162, 278 N.E.2d at 718. To the same effect see the cases cited by 
the Court at 161-62, 278 N.E.2d at 718. 
S But see the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Tauro, which suggests that 
a uniform rule of civil contempt be applied to both individuals and business 
entities. Id. at 163, 278 N.E.2d at 719. 
4 Id. at 162, 278 N.E.2d at 718, quoting from Singer Mfg. Co. v. Sun 
Vacuum Stores, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.N.]. 1961). 
5 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 159, 162, 278 N.E.2d 716, 718. 
G Quoting from Lustgarten v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 92 F.2d 277, 280 
(3d Cir. 1937), the Court impliedly adopted the following view: "'[BJelief, 
motive, or intent . . . do not excuse' the persons alleged to be in contempt 
although the circumstance that they 'were acting in good faith may be taken 
into consideration in mitigation of their offense'." 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 159, 
161, 278 N.E.2d 716, 718. 
14.7. 1 Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1367, 
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delegate broader authority to lesser corporate agents and employees, 2 
and "[ e ]mployees who are in the lower echelon of the corporate hierarchy 
often exercise more responsibility in the everyday operations of the cor-
poration .... "3 (Court's emphasis). Recognizing these realities of modern 
corporate operations, the Court this year concluded that the position 
held by a person in a corporation should not be the decisive criterion of 
corporate criminal responsibility.4 
The question of corporate criminal liability arose in Commonwealth 
v. Beneficial Finance Co.,5 a criminal prosecution against several small 
loans companies for conspiracy and bribery of two state officials who 
were responsible for the regulation of the small loans industries. The 
criminal acts were carried on by agents of the corporate defendants, but 
there was no evidence that they were formally authorized or ratified by 
the corporations. Nevertheless, the crimes had clearly been carried on 
for the benefit of the corporations, and corporate funds had been used 
for the bribes.6 
The defendants in Beneficial argued, inter alia/ that a corporation 
should not be held criminally liable for the conduct of its servants or 
agents unless such conduct was performed, authorized, ratified, adopted 
or tolerated by the corporations' directors, officers or other "high mana-
gerial agents" who are sufficiently high in the corporate hierarchy to 
warrant the assumption that their acts in some substantial sense reflect 
corporate policy. This was the standard adopted by the American Law 
Institute's Model Penal Code.8 
1439, 275 N.E.2d 33, 82. The case is popul1arly known as the "small loans 
case." 
2 Id. at 1440, 275 N.E.2d at 83. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. Thus two of the primary defendants-Beneficial Finance Co. and 
Household Finance Co.-were held criminally liable for the conduct of per-
sons who were neither directors, officers, nor (as to Beneficial) employees of 
those corporations. 
5 Id. at 1367, 275 N.E.2d at 33. 
6 For a more detailed discussion of the facts and proceedings in the Bene-
ficial case, see Student Comment, H.11 infra. 
7 The Beneficial decision involves an opinion covering 180 pages in the 
Advance Sheets and obviously contains many other arguments and issues. The 
magnitude of the case is reflected by the approximately 20,000 pages of trial 
transcript, and 5,400 exceptions as well as 700 alleged assignments of error. 
The Beneficial case is therefore the subject of a more extensive analysis herein 
at §4.11, infra. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Court did reject de-
fendants' contention that civil rules governing jurisdiction should control for 
determining whether the Court had obtained jurisdiction over the corporate 
defendants. The Court declared that it is an "elementary rule that a jurisdiction 
has inherent power to prosecute those who reside outside of its jurisdictional 
boundaries and commit a crime within its boundaries." 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1393 n.8, 275 N.E.2d at 57 n.8. 
8 Id. at 1420, 275 N.E.2d at 72. Section 2.07 of the Code provides that, 
except in limited cases, a corporation may be convicted of a crime if "the com-
12
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In light of the practical problems of corporate complexity and a 
strong public policy for imputing to the corporation some responsibility 
for the criminal acts of lower echelon corporate employees,9 the Supreme 
Judicial Court set forth clear standards of corporate criminal responsi-
bility. Conviction of a corporation for acts of its agents will now be 
sustained if it is shown that "the corporation has placed the agent"-
regardless of whether or not an officer or director-"in a position where 
he has enough authority and responsibility to act for and in behalf of 
the corporation in handling the particular corporate business, operation 
or project in which he was engaged at the time he committed the criminal 
act."10 (Court's emphasis). This standard for criminal liability does not 
depend upon the agent's responsibility or authority with respect to the 
entire corporate business, but only with respect to the alleged criminal 
transaction. 11 
The Court acknowledged that such a standard, unlike the one adopted 
by the Model Penal Code, was generally the same as the civil concept of 
respondeat superior. 12 However, the corporate defendant is amply pro-
tected since crimes must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt"-a 
far greater quantum of proof than "preponderance of the evidence" 
which suffices in civil cases. 
A basic distinction between the Court's standard and the Model Penal 
Code Standard is that the latter refers to the "high managerial agent" 
and makes the qualification that such an agent must have "authorized 
... or recklessly tolerated" the criminal acts. Commentary by the Coun-
cil of the American Law Institute states: 
The general respondeat superior approach ... is rejected ... and 
corporate liability is confined to situations in which the criminal 
conduct is performed or participated in by the board of directors or 
by corporate officers and agents sufficiently high in the hierarchy to 
make it reasonable to assume that their acts are in some substantial 
mission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, perfonned or 
recklessly tolerated by the board ·of directors or by a high managerial' agent 
acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment." 
"High managerial agent" is defined in §2.07 ·as one "having duties of such 
responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy 
of the corporation." 
9 The Court cited the Task Force Report on "white-coIlar" crime conducted 
by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice. 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1367, 1442, 275 N.E.2d 33, 84. The Report noted 
that overt criminal acts are usuaIly perfonned by lower or middle management 
officials rather than by top executives. Task Force Report-Crime and Its 
Impact-An Assessment, at 108 (1967). 
10 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1367, 1445, 275 N.E.2d 33, 86. 
11 The Court's standard was primarily based upon the trial judge's instruc-
tions to the jury. The instructions are set forth at Id. at 1421-22, 275 N.E.2d 
at 72-73. 
12 Id. at 1423-24, 275 N.E.2d at 73-74. 
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sense reflective of the policy of the corporate body. [Such] agents 
[are] .•. those "having responsibility for the formation of corporate 
policy" or "high managerial agents having supervisory responsibility 
over the subject matter of the offense."13 
The Court in Beneficial has also differentiated between criminal re-
sponsibility of an individual and that of a corporation for the acts of 
an agent.14 Because an individual could suffer imprisonment if held 
criminally responsible for the acts of his agents his guilt must be personal 
and not vicarious.15 However, the "corporate entity" in itself is incapable 
of knowing, controlling, directing or participating in anything. It can 
"act" only through its agents. Nevertheless, even for crimes of specific 
intent, the Court has now declared that a corporation may be criminally 
responsible with proof that it participated in, countenanced, or approved 
the act of the agent.16 
§4.8. Responsibility of a parent corporation for the criminal acts of 
a subsidiary corporation. In Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co} 
the defendant Beneficial (parent) argued that it should not be held 
liable for the criminal acts of agents of Beneficial Management (sub-
sidiary), a corporate entity within the "Beneficial Finance System."2 The 
Court rejected this contention, emphasizing that: (1) the parent owned 
the entire stock of the subsidiary; (2) there was a clear interpenetration 
of corporate officers and directors between the parent and subsidiary; 
(3) the business services provided by the subsidiary were provided es-
sentially as a part of the business operations of the parent; and (4) the 
parent and subsidiary shared a common name.3 
Relying upon its decision in My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland 
Farms, Inc.,4 a case deciding the issue of a parent corporation's liability 
for the torts of its subsidiaries, the Court concluded that it should look 
behind the corporate form to determine where ultimate criminal liability 
13 Model PenaF Code §2.07, Commentary (Tent. Draft No.4, 148-51). 
14 Cf. United Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Jay's Stores, Inc. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
159, 278 N.E.2d 716. See the discussion of this case at H.6, supra. 
15 See the authorities cited and discussed by the Court at 1971 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1367, 1427-30, 275 N.E.2d 33, 75-77. 
16 Id. at 1438-39, 275 N.E.2d at 82. 
H.8. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1367, 275 N.E.2d 33. 
2 Id. at 1453, 275 N.E.2d at 91. The Court agreed with the Commonwealth's 
contention that Beneficial Finance represented to the public at large that the 
Beneficial Finance System "was a unitary, centrally controlled whole." Id. at 
1453-54, 275 N.E.2d at 91. 
3 Id. at 1456-57, 275 N.E.2d at 92-93. 
4 353 Mass. 614, 233 N.E.2d 748. There the Court found a corporation 
liable for the torts of several satellite corporations even though the corporation 
owned no stock in the satellites. The evidence revealed, however, that a 
dominant figure in the corporate structure owned stock in both the principal 
and satellite corporations, and that he exercised control over the latter in behalf 
of the principal corporation. Other salient facts revealed were that all the 
corporations had the same officers and operated as a single enterprise under the 
same name and out of the same headquarters. 
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should lie.5 Corporations, therefore, cannot shield themselves from civil 
or criminal liability by shifting it to subsidiary or satellite corporations 
unless those entities retain a sufficient degree of autonomy from the 
parent corporation. 
That the corporate structure may be pierced in criminal actions was 
an a fortiori conclusion in light of the availabiilty of such procedure 
where the remedy is civil. As the Court noted in Beneficial, "[t]he interest 
of the Commonwealth in protecting itself and its citizens from the criminal 
acts of foreign corporations is of much greater importance than the 
right of one person to pursue a civil remedy against a foreign corporate 
defendant."6 
B. LEGISLATION 
§4.9. Domestic charitable corporations: Legislative changes. By an 
emergency act,1 approved and effective on October 1, 1971, Chapter 
180 of the General Laws was comprehensively consolidated, rearranged 
and revised. The principal purposes of this amendment are to modernize 
and simplify the process of forming a Chapter 180 corporation and to 
bring the chapter into uniformity with the more liberal provisions of 
Chapter 156B which governs certain business corporations. 
Formation. The new statute, borrowing language from Section 12 
of Chapter 156B, now provides that "[o]ne or more persons, of the age 
of twenty-one years or more in the case of natural persons, may act as 
incorporators"2 of a Chapter 180 corporation. The prior law had re-
quired that "[s]even or more persons, a majority of whom are residents 
of the commonwealth, may form [the] corporation .... "3 Other forma-
tion provisions which are incorporated into Chapter 180 by reference 
5 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1367, 1454-59, 275 N.E.2d 33, 91-94. 
6 Id. at 1458, 275 N.E.2d at 93-94. 
H.9. 1 Acts of 1971,. c. 819, §§3-1O, amending G.L., c. 180, §§1-7, 9-11B, 
17, 26A-28. Section 3 of the act provides in part: 
All corporations existing on [the effective date of the statute] and their 
directors, officers, members and stockholders shall be entitled to all the 
rights, privileges and immunities and be subject to all the liabilities set 
forth in this chapter to the same extent as corporations formed under this 
chapter and their directors, officers and members; provided that this chap-
ter shall not take away or impair any remedy which may exist by law 
against a corporation existing on said date, its directors, officers, members 
or stockholders, for a liability incurred prior thereto. 
All corporations shall be subject to such laws as may be enacted after 
[the effective date of the statute] affecting or altering their corporate 
rights or duties or dissolving them. 
Section 11 of the act further provides: "Nothing in this act shall affect the 
validity of capital' stock heretofore lawfully issued by a charitable corporation 
nor the rights of hoMers of such stock; provided, that no additional capital 
stock shall be issued by such corporation." 
2 Id. at §3, amending G.L., c. 180 by inserting §3. 
S G.L., c. 180, §t, amended by Acts of 1971, c. 819, §3. 
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include: G.L., c. 69, §30 (approval of organization certificate); G.L., 
c. 155, §2B (approval of articles of organization) ; G.L., c. 156B, §11 
(assumption of corporate name); G.L., c. 156B, §12 (incorporators; adop-
tion of by-laws and election of officers; signing and filing of articles of 
organization) ; and G.L., c. 156B, §13 (substance of articles of organiza-
tion). However, "the corporation may have no capital stock, the articles 
of incorporation shall omit references to stock and stockholders [and] 
specify the purposes for which the corporation is formed and the cor-
poration may not assume a name that is misleading as to its corporate 
purposes."4 
Section 3 of the former statute required that the incorporators enter 
a written Agreement of Association with the intention of forming a 
corporation. The new statute supplants that requirement, adopting from 
Section 12 of Chapter 156B the more flexible organization provision 
permitting the incorporators to act by written consent. Other complex 
formation provisions have also been deleted in deference to the simpler 
procedures required and permitted by Chapter 156B.3 
Purposes. The incorporators, in organizing the corporation, must 
form it for one of the purposes outlined in Section 4 of the new statute.6 
Those purposes are substantially the same as had been permitted under 
Sections 2 and 4 of the former statute, with the exception that one ad-
ditional purpose is permitted-that of pursuing any chiropractic en-
deavor. The scope of the permissible purposes is broad, however, and 
there was probably no need to expand them any more than was done. 
Investigation. Prior to the recent revisions, two sections of Chapter 
180 covered topics relating to the investigation of proposed corporations~ 
Only one of these sections was retained.' Former section 6 required the 
secretary of state to refer the articles of incorporation of a proposed 
charitable corporation to the Department of Public Welfare for the 
speedy investigation of several specified matters.8 The Department was 
required to afford the applicants due process of law including a public 
hearing with notice. It was the duty of the secretary of state to endorse 
the recommendation of the Department as to whether or not the applica-
4 Acts of 1971, c. 819, §3, amending G.L., c. 180, §3. 
5 Id. Generally, all references to Chapter 156 have been dropped, and Sec-
tions 11, 12 and 13 of Chapter 156B have been adopted in their place, with 
the exceptions and modifications set forth in the text accompanying n. 4 supra. 
6 Id. 
, Section 5 has undergone a title change but remains unaltered textually, 
except for a change in reference from former §2 to the new §4o. 
8 The Department of Public Welfare had to "immediately make an investiga-
tion as to the applic3lllts for incorporation, [or] the corporation ... and the 
purposes thereof, and of aU material facts, including facts tending to show 
that the probable purpose is to cover any illegal business, or that the applicants 
• . . are not suitable persons, from lack of financial ability or from any other 
cause, and facts as ,to the present -need for an organization with such purposes 
at the time and place and with respect to the special circumstances set forth 
in such articles .... " G.L., c. 180, §6, repealed by Acts of 1971, c. 819, §3. 
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tion of incorporation should be approved. If the application were treated 
unfavorably, the applicants were allowed to appeal the decision to the 
superior court which made the final determination on the matter. This 
entire process has been omitted from the new act. 
Section 5, which was retained,9 permits but does not require the secre-
tary of state to call upon the governing board of the municipality where 
the proposed corporation plans to operate to investigate the reputations 
of persons associated with the proposed corporation and the suitability 
of the suggested location of the corporation. The governing board must 
make an immediate investigation and send a report of factual findings 
to the secretary who may, in his discretion, approve or disapprove the 
application. Although "[t]he Act contains no provisions regarding appeal 
from the decision of the Secretary of State ... his action may fall within 
the scope of the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act."l0 
Powers. The new Section 6 substantially expands and clarifies the 
9 G.L., c. 180, §5 as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 819, 13 provides: 
Before making and issuing a certificate of incorporation to or approving 
a change of location of .the principal office of a corporation formed for any 
of the purposes described in section four or approving the change of name 
of any corporation formed as aforesaid which is subject to section twenty-
six, the state secretary may forward a statement to the aldermen of any 
city, except Boston, or to the selectmen of any town, where such corpora-
tion occupies or uses or is to occupy or use any premises for the transaction 
of any of its corporate activities, and, if such premises are or are to be in 
Bqston, to the police commissioner, giving a l'ist of the applicants for incor-
poration or the officers of the corporation seeking to change its name or 
location, the purposes of such proposed incorporation or change of name 
as stated by them, the location of the premises occupied or used or pro-
posed to be occupied, or used, which shall include the street and number, 
if any, and all other facts which may be stated in the application for in-
corporation or the petition for approval of change of name or location. 
The mayor and aldermen,selectmen or police commissioner, upon the re-
ceipt of such statement, shall immediately make investigation for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether any of the proposed incorporators, or officers 
of the petitioning corporation, or any other persons known to be, or ap-
parently, identified with the said proposed or petitioning corporation as 
members, employees or otherwise, and actual1y participating or to partici-
pate in the management of its affairs, or in the direction of its business, 
have been engaged in the illegal selling of alcoholic beverages, as defined 
in section one of chapter one hundred and thirty-eight, or in keeping places 
or tenements used for illegal gaming, or any other business or vocation 
prohibited by law, or are persons of ill repute, or whether any location to 
be occupied is unsuitable, and shall forthwith report to the state secretary 
all the facts ascertained. If, in his opinion, it appears from said report or 
otherwise that a probable purpose or probable result of the formation of the 
proposed corporation or of the proposed change of name or location is or 
will be to cover or shield any illegal business or practices, or any business 
not within the scope of the expressed corporate purposes, he shall refuse 
to issue a certificate of incorporation or approve the change of name or 
location, as the case may be. 
10 Hughes, Changes in the Laws Relating to Domestic Charitable Corpora-
tions, 57 Mass. L.Q. 71, 72 (1972). 
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operational powers of a Chapter 180 corporation. Perhaps the most sig-
nificant provision of Section 6 is the one which confers the power to "hold 
real and personal estate to an unlimited amount." (Emphasis added). 
Fonner Section 9 pennitted the corporation to hold such property only 
"to an amount not to exceed five million dollars." There is also a clause 
in the new section which shields the "unlimited amount" provision from 
any special law which may specify a limited amount. 
The new Section 6 also confers upon the corporation the general 
powers specified in Section 9 of Chapter 156B which were not previously 
applicable to Chapter 180 corporations. Specifically included are the 
powers spelled out in subsections (a) (duration of corporate name); (b) 
(power to sue and be sued); (c) (corporate seal); (d) (election and 
appointment, compensation, duties, and indemnification of directors, 
officers, employees, and other agents); and (k) (donations for limited 
purposes) of Section 9 plus the power to convey land to which it has 
legal title are given to the corporation. In addition, the corporation may 
exercise any of the other powers specified in Section 9,11 except those to 
which subsection (m) applies (dealing in own shares of stock), and the 
powers specified in Section 9A of Chapter 156B (power to enter into 
partnership) so long as, and to the extent to which, those powers are 
conferred on the corporation by its articles of organization. From a 
practical point of view, it is important for the incorporators of a Chapter 
180 corporation to foresee which powers may be needed in the future 
and to provide accordingly in the articles of organization. Such fore-
thought may avoid the necessity of later amending the articles of or-
ganization under the new Section 7 which requires a two-thirds vote by 
the qualified voting members of the corporation and the submission of 
articles of amendment to the state secretary. Furthennore, any powers 
existing at the time of the enactment of the new statute are to remain 
11 The following powers under c. 156B, §9 may be exercised by a Chapter 
180 corporation if and to the extent to which they are conferred· on the cor-
poration by its articles of organization: the power to deal in and with real 
or personal property or any interest therein (§9(e)); to deal in and with all 
or any of its own property or any interest therein (§9(f)); to deal in and with 
the bonds and other obligations, shares, or other securities or interests issued 
by others (§9(g)); to mortgage or otherwise encumber its own property (§9(h)); 
to lend or invest its funds taking real and personal property as security there-
fore (§9(i)); to carry on its operations in any jurisdiction within or without 
the United States (§9 (j) ); to create pension and similar plans for its directors, 
officers and employees (§9(l')); to participate as a subscriber in the exchanging 
of insurance contracts specified in c. 175, §94B (§9 (n) ); to be an incorporator 
of other corporations (§9 (0) ); and to have and exercise all powers necessary 
or convenient to effect any or all of the purposes for which the corporation is 
formed (§9 (p) ). In relation to the powers enumerated above, the new §6 of c. 
180 adds the caveat that no such powers shaH be exercised in a manner in-
consistent with c. 180 or any other chapter of the General Laws. 
18
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in effect.12 An entirely new section13 lists several other provisions of 
Chapter 156B which shall apply to a Chapter 180 corporation. 
The new Section 6 also substantially adopts the language of Section 
115 of Chapter 156B: 
Any recordable instrument purporting to affect an interest in real 
estate, executed in the name of a corporation by two of its officers, 
of whom one is the president or a vice-president and the other is the 
treasurer ... , shall be binding on the corporation in favor of a 
purchaser or other person relying in good faith on such instrument 
notwithstanding inconsistent provisions of the articles of organiza-
tion, by-laws, resolutions or votes of the corporation.14 (Emphasis 
added) . 
The Chapter 180 corporation is thus forwarned that it should closely 
oversee the acts of its officers dealing with real estate transactions. 
Finally the new Section 6 specifies the methods by which and the 
extent to which the directors, officers, employees and agents of the cor-
poration may be indemnified. The old chapter did not provide the power 
to indemnify, but the new Section 6 provides that the power to indemnify 
may be conferred by (1) the articles of organization, (2) a duly adopted 
by-law, or (3) a vote adopted by a majority of the members entitled to 
vote on the election of directors. The extent of indemnification for non-
directors may be determined by· the directors unless the articles of or-
ganization or by-laws state otherwise. The corporation may pay the 
expenses incurred in defending a civil action prior to its final disposition; 
however, the party so indemnified must first agree to return such pay-
ment if the court finds he is not entitled to indemnification. A person 
adjudicated not to have acted in good faith on behalf of the corporation 
is not entitled to indemnification, and it would clearly appear that such 
a person is required to repay any advance payments made by the cor-
poration to cover his litigation expenses. The corporation is also granted 
the power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any of the 
persons mentioned above against any liability incurred in any corporate 
capacity or arising out of his employment. This latter power is indepen-
dent of the power to indemnify the person against such liability. 
By-laws. Section 6A of the revised statute deals with matters relating 
to the by-laws of the corporation and is generally siInilar to former Sec-
tion 7. The amended version, however, provides that "[a] corporation 
may make, amend and repeal by-laws in the manner prescribed in and 
subject to sections sixteen and seventeen of chapter one hundred and 
fifty-six B, substituting members for stockholders."15 The former section 
was silent on the method of making by-laws and made no provision for 
their amendment or repeal. 
12 Acts of 1971, c. 819, §3, amending G.L., c. 180 by inserting the new §6. 
13 rd. at 15, amending G.L., c. 180 by inserting §10A. 
14 rd. at 13. 
15 rd. 
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Corporate clerk. Section 6A also imposes a duty on the corporation 
to have a clerk who is a resident of Massachusetts or, alternately, a duly 
appointed resident agen~. The corporation's failure to comply with the 
duty imposed will result in a penalty of not more than five hundred 
dollars to be recovered pursuant of Section 113 of Chapter 156B.16 
Consolidation and merger. Section 10 of the statute adds new pro-
visions covering the consolidation and merger of Chapter 180 corpora-
tions with other corporations.17 It provides: 
Any two or more corporations may consolidate to form a new 
corporation, or may merge into a single corporation, which may be 
any of the constituent corporations; and anyone or more corpora-
tions may consolidate or merge with one or more other corporations 
organized under the laws of any other state or states of the United 
States, if the laws of such other state or states permit; the resulting 
or surviving corporation in the case of any such consolidation or 
merger to be a co.rporation having no capital stock organized under 
this chapter for anyone or more of the purposes mentioned in section 
four. Any such consolidation or merger, carried out in the manner 
specified in this section, shall have the effect set fourth in section 
eighty of chapter one hundred and fifty-six B.18 (Emphasis added). 
Corporations which merge or consolidate must enter into an agreement 
of consolidation or merger and file a copy of the articles of consolida-
tion in the registry of deeds within twenty days of the effective date of 
the merger or consolidation.19 
Dissolution and filing fees. Section 11, the subject matter of which is 
new, sets out the method by which a corporation that is not a public 
charity may be dissolved.20 Sections 11A and 11B, which have been re-
tained,21 provide for the voluntary and involuntary dissolution of public 
charitable corporations respectively. Finally, Section 11C, also new, lists 
various fees which must be filed.22 
16 Id. 





22 The section provides: 
(a) The fee for filing articles of organization required by section three 
shall be thirty dollars. 
(b) The fee for filing articles of amendment required by section seven 
shall be ten dollars. 
(c) The fee for filing restated articles of organization in accordance with 
section seven shall be thirty dollars. 
(d) The fee for filing a petition in accordance with section seven A 
shall be thirty dollars. 
(8) The fee for filing articles of consolidation or merger in accordance 
with section ten shan be thirty dollars. 
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§4-.1O. Professional corporations: Statutory amendments. The Mas-
sachusetts Professional Corporations Statute1 requires that "[n]o person 
shall be an officer, director or shareholder of a. professional corporation 
unless he is duly registered to render the same professional service as 
those for which the corporation was organized."2 It also requires that 
"[such] corporation may render professional services only through its 
officers, employees and agents who are duly registered .... "3 By recent 
amendment," these mandates were clarified to provide that "neither the 
clerk nor any assistant clerk [of a professional corporation] shall as such 
be deemed to be an officer."5 As a result of the statutory change a cor-
porate clerk need no longer be a professional so duly registered; he may 
be an attorney who represents the corporation. 
Another recent statutory change allows "[a] professional corporation 
engaged in the commonwealth in the practice of public accounting [to] 
register with the board [of public accountancy] as a professional corpora-
tion"6 as long as such corporation is organized pursuant to the Professional 
Corporation Statute. Furthermore, no corporation, except one so or-
ganized, may use the designation "certified public accountant" (or CPA) 
or "public accountant" (or PA).7 Prior to the amendment, rio corpora-
tion could use such designation. It still remains the law, however, that 
no corporation, including a professional one, may use a designation likely 
to be confused with the CPA or PA titles.8 
The status of certain staff members of the professional accounting cor-
poration has also been clarified. Specifically, "unregistered managers, 
senior staff accountants, and junior staff accountants employed by such 
a professional corporation may render professional services under the 
supervision of registered officers, employees and agents of such a pro-
fessional corporation."9 
(I) The fee for the reservation of a name, or the extension of a reserva-
tion, shall be seven dollars and payment of the fee shall accompany the 
application. 
(g) The fee for filing all other certificates, statements or reports re-
quired by this chapter shall be ten dollars for each certificate, statement or 
report, unless another filing fee is specificall'y provided therefor. 
The fee schedule above reflects adjustments made by Acts of 1972, c. 684, §§110 
to 116 inclusive. 
14.10. 1 G.L., c. 156A. 
2 Id. at 18. 
SId. at §9 . 
.. Acts of 1972, c. 316, §t, amending G.L., c. 156A, 18. 
SId. Section 9 had already provided that a clerk was not deemed to be an 
"employee" under that section. 
6 Acts of 1972, c. 693, §t, amending G.L., c. 112, §87A(c). 
7 Id. at 14, amending G.L., c. 112, 187D(6). 
8 Id. The nonexclusive designations which the statute prohibits any cor-
poration to use are "certified accountant" (or CA), "chartered accountant," 
"enrolled accountant" (or EA), "licensed accountant" (cir LA), or "registered 
accountant" (or RA). Id. 
9 Acts of 1972, c. 693, 16, amending G.L., c. 156A, §9. 
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STUDENT COMMENT 
§4.11. Criminal liability of a corporation for the acts of its agents: 
Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Company.l The defendant cor-
porations were indicted for conspiracy to bribe and for offering bribes 
to public officials. These indictments resulted in two separate criminal 
trials known as the "small loans" cases. In the first trial the defendant 
corporations, Beneficial Finance Company (Beneficial) , Household 
Finance Company (Household) and Liberty Loan Corporation were 
convicted of conspiracy to bribe and of offering bribes to Martin J. 
Hanley, supervisor of loan agencies,2 and Morris Garfinkle, a member 
of the Small Loans Regulatory Board,S in order to "fix" the results of 
hearings to be conducted by the Board relating to the maximum per-
missible interest rates on smallloans.4 At the second trial the defendant 
corporations Beneficial, Household and Local Finance Corporation were 
convicted of conspiring, during a period of seven years (1957-1963), to 
bribe Hanley in order to influence the exercise of his extensive adminis-
trative power over the small loans industry in Massachusetts.5 The de-
fendants, Beneficial and Household, appealed arguing that in each case 
the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on the standards to be 
applied in determining the criminal liability of corporations for the acts 
of their agents. They contended: 
a corporation should not be held criminally liable for the conduct 
of its servants or agents unless such conduct was performed, autho-
rized, ratified, adopted or tolerated by the corporation's directors, 
officers or other "high managerial agents" who are sufficiently high 
in the corporate hierarchy to warrant the assumption that their 
acts in some substantial sense reflect corporate policy.6 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions holding, inter alia. 
that the trial judge had correctly instructed the jury that 
14.11. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. 1367, 275 N.E.2d 33. The opinion of the 
Supreme Judicial Court covers a number of issues raised by the individual as well 
as the corporate defendants in both cases. The scope of this casenote is confined 
to that part of the opinion which deals with the standards to be applied in deter-
mining a corporation's criminal responsibility for the acts of its agents. 
2 The commissioner of banks has licensing and regulatory power over the small 
loans industry in Massachusetts. G.L., c. 140 §§96, 97. The supervisor of loans 
agencies is a deputy appointed by the commissioner to aid in the execution of 
his statutory duties. G.L., c. 26 14. 
S The Small Loans Regulatory Board is an independent board within the 
division of banks and loan agencies which has authority to determine and estab-
lish the maximum rate of interest on small loans. G.L., c. 26 §5A; G.L., c. 140 
1100. 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1369, 275 N.E.2d at 42-43. 
5 Id. at 1369-70, 275 N.E.2d at 43. 
6 Id. at 1420, 275 N.E.2d at 71. This standard is the one adopted by the 
American Law Institute; Model Penal Code 12.07(1) (c) (May, 1962 Draft) 
[hereinafter cited as Code]. 
22
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/7
§4.11 PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS 83 
the quantum of proof necessary to sustain the conviction of a cor-
poration for the acts of its agents is sufficiently met if it is shown 
that the corporation has placed the agent in a position where he has 
enough authority and responsibility to act for and in behalf of the 
corporation in handling the particular corporate business, operation 
or project in which he was engaged at the time he committed the 
criminal act.7 (court's emphasis). 
The instructions approved by the Court contained the further require-
ment that the conduct for which the corporation is being held account-
able be performed on behalf of the corporation.S 
The standard embodied in the trial judge's instructions and that ad-
vocated by the defendants are similar in that neither restricts the type 
of crime of which a corporation may be convicted. The main difference 
between them lies in the latter's reference to a "high managerial agent" 
and in its requirement that to impose corporate criminal liability, it 
must at least appear that a director or such agent of the corporation 
authorized or recklessly tolerated the criminal conduct involved.9 The 
trial judge's instructions focused on the authority of the agent within 
the particular sphere of corporate business in which the criminal act 
was performed as opposed to his authority within the corporation as 
a whole. 
Rejecting the defendants' contention that the trial judge's instructions 
were erroneous, the court stated that the judge correctly charged the 
jury on the basis of decided cases.10 However, the only Massachusetts 
case cited by the court in support of its position is Telegram Newspaper 
Co. v. Commonwealth.l1 In Telegram, two newspaper corporations were 
convicted of criminal contempt for publishing articles relating to a pend-
ing trial. The treasurer and manager of one corporate defendant and 
the editor and manager of the other were discharged because they were 
not shown to be directly responsible for the publication of the articles 
in question. The Supreme Judicial Court thought it probable that a 
court reporter was responsible, but assumed that whoever wrote and 
carused the articles to be published acted without any intent to pervert 
the course of justice.12 The Court found the question to be whether the 
publication of these articles without specific intent, an intent to pervert 
the course of justice, could be adjudged a contempt. IS In Telegram, the 
Court affirmed the contempt convictions of the corporate defendants 
7 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1445, 275 N.E.2d at 86. 
SId. at 1424, 275 N.E.2d at 74. 
9 Id. at 1422-23, 275 N.E.2d at 73. 
10 Id. at 1423, 275 N.E.2d at 73. 
11 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445 (1899). 
12 Id. at 299, 52 N.E. at 447. 
IS Ibid. 
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emphasizing that contempt "does not depend upon the intention of the 
party but upon the act he has done."14 
In Beneficial, the defendant corporations attempted to distinguish 
Telegram on the ground that it was a case of strict liability involving 
a crime which did not require specific intent.15 They contended that there 
was no Massachusetts case dispositive of the question as to when a cor-
poration may be held criminally liable for the acts of its servants or agents 
where the offense is one which involves specific intent.16 Suggesting that 
specific intent was an element in Telegramp the Court in Beneficial 
held that Telegram was properly applied as precedent for the rule that 
a corporation can be held criminally responsible for the acts of one who 
is neither an officer nor a director.18 
The Court's application of the Telegram case in Beneficial is arguably 
improper. Although there is dictum in Telegram to the effect that a 
corporation may be liable criminally for certain offenses of which specific 
intent may be a necessary element,19 the Court was "content to assume 
that the person . . . who wrote and caused the articles to be published 
did not know this rule of law, and acted without any intent to pervert 
the course of justice."20 Furthermore, Telegram has consistently been 
cited by Massachusetts courts for the rule that it is the nature of the act 
and not the accompanying intent which is the determinative factor in 
establishing contempt.21 The absence in Telegr:am of specific intent, 
which may be defined as a specifically required actual intent, above and 
beyond the criminal intent to do an unlawful act,22 renders that case of 
doubtful precedential value to Beneficial. The crime of bribery is one 
which requires specific intent; the offer must be corruptly made with 
the intent to influence the official in the discharge of his duties.23 In a 
prosecution for an offense of which specific intent is a necessary element, 
the state must affirmatively prove this particular intent or facts from 
which it may be inferred. Although Telegram may properly be applied 
as precedent for the rule that the act of an agent who is neither an officer 
nor director may bind a corporation criminally, that case did not hold 
that the specific intent of such an agent may be treated as that of the 
14 Id. at 300, 52 N.E. at 447. 
15 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1426, 275 N.E.2d at 75. 
16 Id. at 1424, 275 N.E.2d at 74. 
17 Id. at 1426-27, 275 N.E.2d at 75. 
18 Id. at 1426, 275 N.E.2d at 75. 
19 172 Mass. at 297, 52 N.E. at 446. 
20 Id. at 299, 52 N.E. at 447. 
21 Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 612, 188 N.E.2d 923, 925 (1963); 
Woodbury v. Commonwealth, 295 Mass. 316, 319, 3 N.E.2d 779, 782 (1936); 
Globe Newspaper 00. v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 449, 453, 74 N.E. 682, 684 
(1905); 3 R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure §1329 (1957). 
Contra, H. Ballantine, Manual of Corporate Law and Practice, 311 (1930). 
22 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 202 (1972); R. Perkins, 
Criminal Law 751 (2d ed. 1969). 
23 G.L., c. 268A §2. 
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corporation in the prosecution of a corporation for an offense involving 
that element. It was not, therefore, dispositive of that issue in Beneficial. 
Historically, the traditional principle of criminal law, that guilt is 
personal and consequently a crime is not committed if the mind of the 
person doing the act is innocent,24 has been the greatest barrier to the 
imposition of criminal liability on a corporation. At early common law 
it was asserted that a corporation could not be guilty of any crime. In 
1765 Blackstone wrote: "A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, 
or other crime, in its corporate capacity: though its members may, in 
their distinct individual capacity."25 However, corporate criminal liability 
was early recognized for acts of non-feasance, the failure to perform a 
duty imposed by law,26 and within a short time corporations were held 
liable for maintaining a public nuisance, a misfeasance at common law.27 
Courts were careful to distinguish these crimes from those of which 
specific intent was a requisite element. In Commonwealth v. Proprietors 
of New Bedford Bridge}8 the Supreme Judicial Court, holding a cor-
poration indictable for maintaining a public nuisance, stated: 
Corporations cannot be indicted for offences which derive their 
criminality from evil intention .... But beyond this, there is no 
good reason for their exemption from the consequences of unlawful 
and wrongful acts committed by their agents in pursuance of au-
thority derived from them. Such a rule would, in many cases, pre-
clude all adequate remedy, and render reparation for an injury, 
committed by a corporation, impossible; because it would leave the 
only means of redress to be sought against irresponsible servants, 
instead of those who truly committed the wrongful act by com-
manding it to be done.29 
The enactment of numerous "public welfare" statutes opened the door 
to a more widespread imposition of corporate criminal liability. These 
statutes, enacted by the legislatures in the exercise of the police power, 
dispense with the traditional criminal law requirement of wrongful 
intent and prohibit under penalty the performance of a specific act.30 In 
the leading case on corporate criminal liability, New York Central & 
Hudson River R.R. v. United States,31 the United States Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of such a statute. The defendant cor-
poration was convicted under a section of the Elkins Act which imposed 
24 Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 142, 93 N.E. 249 (1910). 
25 1 W. Bl'ackstone, Commentaries *476. 
26 The Queen v. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry., 114 Eng. Rep. 492 (Q.B. 
1842) . 
27 The Queen v. Great NOI'th of England Ry., 115 Eng. Rep. 1294 (Q.B. 
1846) . 
28 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (1854). 
29 Id. at 345-46. 
30 Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910). 
31 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
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criminal liability on corporations whose agents violated that statute. In 
upholding the constitutionality of that section the Court declared: 
It is true that there are some crimes, which in their nature cannot 
be committed by corporations. But there is a large class of offenses 
. . . wherein the crime consists in purposely doing the things pro-
hibited by statute. In that class of crimes we see no good reason why 
corporations may not be held responsible for and charged with the 
knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority 
conferred upon them.32 
The Court continued in broader language: 
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, 
why the corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only 
act through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine 
because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it has 
intrusted authority to act .... 33 
While noting that the opinion in New York Central concerned the 
constitutionality of the statutory imputation of the agent's acts to a 
corporation, the Supreme Judicial Court in Beneficial stated that New 
York Central is akin to Telegr,am in that it serves as precedent for the 
rule that a corporation may be held criminally liable for the acts of one 
who is neither a director, an officer nor a high managerial agent of the 
corporation.34 However, New York Central, like Telegram, is a case in 
which it was not necessary to prove specific intent on the part of the 
oorporation; consequently, the Supreme Court did not consider the 
question of when criminal liability may be imposed on a corporation in 
the absence of a statute which either dispensed with the requirement of 
intent or provided for the imputation of its agents' intent to a corpora-
tion. The Supreme Judicial Court in Beneficial extends the principle of 
New York Central when it asserts that that case illustrates the public 
policy rationale for imposing liability upon a corporation.35 In New York 
Central Congress had determined that the public interest in controlling 
shipping rebates justified holding a corporation criminally liable for any 
violation of the act by its agents and that the imposition of such liability 
on corporations not only would be an effective way to control the abuses 
at which the statute was aimed, but in fact was necessary if these abuses 
were to be controlled.36 Although it may be argued that the threat to 
the public welfare posed by the exertion of improper influence on public 
officials by corporate agents justifies the imposition of a broad standard 
of liability on corporations, there has been no legislative determination 
32 Id. at 494-95. 
33 Id. at 495. 
34 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1432-33, 275 N.E.2d at 79. 
35 Id. at 1433, 275 N.E.2d at 79. 
36 212 U.S. at 495-96. 
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that the imposition of such liability is necessary to control and will be 
effective in controlling this evil. Furthermore, the Court in Beneficial did 
not limit the application of its holding to this type of crime. 
Subsequent federal cases relying upon New Yark Central have affirmed 
the conviction of corporations for conspiracy, a crime requiring specific 
intent. The Court in Beneficial relied principally upon Egan v. United 
States37 and C.I.T. Corp. v. United States.38 In Egan. the conviction of 
a corporation and its president for conspiracy to violate the Public Utili-
ties Holding Act by making political contributions was affirmed. Although 
the crime in Egan was committed by the president and officers of the 
corporation, the court's holding was broader than the facts required in 
that it stressed· that a corporation could be held responsible for the crim-
inal acts and intent of either officers or agents.39 In C.I.T .• which also 
involved the crime of conspiracy, the circuit court, rejecting the defen-
dant corporation's contention that abranoh manager was too low in 
the corporate hierarchy to bind the corporation criminally, declared: "It 
is the function delegated to the corporate officer or agent which deter-
mines his power to engage the corporation in a criminal transaction."40 
It appears to be settled in the federal courts that the test to be applied 
in determining corporate criminal liability, regardless of whether specific 
intent is an element of the crime charged, is the "kinship of the acts to 
authority" test.41 Under this test a corporation is liable for the criminal 
acts of any agent provided only that the agent has been vested with 
authority to act on behalf of the corporation in the sphere of corporate 
business in which he commits the criminal act. However, there is no 
consensus in the state courts as to when a corporation is criminally liable 
for the acts of its agents. The state courts which have considered the 
question have held that a corporation may be convicted of a crime in-
volving specific intent either citing the federal cases as authority, or by 
way of analogy to tort liability.42 
Although state courts have applied the kinship of the acts to au-
thority test enunciated in the federal cases,43 there is authority for the 
principle that before a corporation can be held responsible for criminal 
acts something more than the mere fact of an agency relationship be-
37 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 194-3). 
38 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945). 
39 137 F.2d at 379. 
40 150 F.2d at 89. 
41 United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). 
42 W. T. Grant Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 284-, 100 Cal. Rptr. 
179 (1972); State v. Municipal Auto Sales, Inc., 222 So.2d 278 (Dist. Ct. App. 
Fla. 1969); State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 13 N.J. Super 172, 80 A.2d 342 
(1951); Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 194 Wis. 636, 217 N.W. 4-12 (1928); State 
v. Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 610, 69 S.E. 58 (1910); State v. Eastern Coal 
Co., 29 R.I. 254-, 70 A. 1 (1908). 
43 Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 194- Wis. 636, 217 N.W. 4-12 (1928); State v. 
Eastern Coal Co., 29 R.I. 254-, 70 A. 1 (1908). 
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tween the criminal actor and the corporation is required. In People v. 
Canadian Fur Trappers Corp.,44 the New York Court of Appeals stated: 
While a corporation may be guilty of larceny, may be guilty of the 
intent to steal, the evidence must go farther than in cases involving 
solely the violation of prohibitory statutes. The intent must be the 
intent of the corporation and not merely that of the agent.45 
The court went on to state that such intent was to be found in the 
authorization or acquiescence of officers or directors.46 In State v. Adjust-
ment Department Credit Bureau, Inc.,47 a corporation appealed its con-
viction for extortion arguing that the trial court's instructions to the jury 
regarding the standards of corporate criminal responsibility were erro-
neous. The charge objected to was substantially the same as that approved 
in Beneficial. The Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
The question, is how can a corporation, an artificial being, have the 
necessary mens rea to commit those crimes where specific intent is 
required. The answer is found in the relationship between the cor-
poration and the agent that performed the acts for which the cor-
poration is being criminally charged, and in the nature of the crime 
with which the corporation is being charged.48 
By way of analogy to the law of punitive damages, the court held that, 
where a legislative purpose to impose strict liability upon corporations 
does not plainly appear, a corporation could not be bound by the acts 
of its agent unless that agent's acts were authorized, requested, com-
manded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by 
a high managerial agent acting with the scope of his office or employ-
ment.49 This test has been called the "superior agent" and "public neces-
sity" doctrine of corporate criminal responsibility. 50 
The "public necessity" - "superior agent" test of corporate criminal 
responsibility is attractive for several reasons. Corporations are on notice 
that they are subject to absolute liability for any violation of those statutes 
which reflect a legislative determination that corporate criminal respon-
sibility is required to regulate the prohibited. conduct. Corporations are 
thus given incentive to familiarize all of their agents with the provisions 
of such statutes. A narrower standard of responsibility is reasonable in 
the case of more serious crimes where the threat of imprisonment and 
moral condemnation should be enough to deter the individual agent from 
committing such crimes, absent either active or passive encouragement on 
44 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455 (1928). 
45 Id. at 163, 161 N.E. at 456. 
46 Id. at 164, 161 N.E. at 456. 
47 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971). 
48 Id. at 689-90. 
49 Id. at 691. 
50 Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents, 60 Harv. 
L. Rev. 283, 289 (1946). 
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the part of his superiors. Furthermore, this rule preserves to some extent 
the traditional criminal law doctrine of mens rea or criminal intent in 
that it restricts the liability of corporations to situations where the crim-
inal acts reflect either a corporate policy to encourage criminality or such 
negligence as to warrant a finding that criminal conduct is not violative 
of corporate policy. 
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (Code) rejected the 
"kinship of acts to authority" test and adopted the more restrictive 
"superior agent" standard. The Code imposes the broader standard of 
corporate liability enunciated in the federal cases where the offense is a 
violation of, or is defined by, a statute in which a legislative intent to 
impose liability on a corporation plainly appears.51 However, in the case 
of serious crimes a corporation may be convicted only where the com-
mission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed 
or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial 
agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office 
or employment.52 A high managerial agent means "an officer of a cor-
poration . . . or any other agent having duties of such responsibility that 
his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the cor-
poration."53 The offenses for which the corporations were convicted in 
Beneficial would be serious offenses under the Code, and, therefore, cor-
porate liability would be judged under the "superior agent" standard. 
In Beneficial the defendant corporations argued that the Code standard 
should be applied. The Supreme Judicial Court refused to apply the Code 
standard but noted that it was not clear that the defendants would be in 
a better position under that standard. 54 The criteria defining "high mana-
gerial agent" in the Code were purposely made very general because of 
the wide variations found in corporate structure.55 The focus of that 
definition is upon the responsibility of the agent. Barber, a "Staff Execu-
tive," was the divisional director for the northern area of Household's 
public relations department, an area that encompasses all of the New 
England States. Barber's immediate superior at Household was Haughan, 
an executive vice-president of that corporation. Given the length of time 
over which the activities in these cases were carried on and the amounts 
of corporate funds expended, it might well be found that Haughan 
recklessly tolerated such activity. Farrell was a vice-president and director 
of Beneficial Management, a wholly owned subsidiary of Beneficial, and 
was listed in Beneficial's annual report as one of "the men behind Bene-
ficial." The trial court found that Farrell was authorized by Beneficial 
to deal with Hanley, and that in so doing he acted as an agent of Bene-
ficial. To find that these men were "high managerial agents" within the 
51 Code § 2.07(1) (a). 
52 Code § 2.07(1) (c). 
53 Code § 2.07(1) (c). 
54 1971 MaSt!. Adv. Sh. at 1423, 275 N.E.2d at 73. 
55 Model Penal Code § 2.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955). 
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definition of the Model Penal Code would do violence neither to the 
wording nor to the spirit of the statute. 
Even if these agents did not meet that standard, the court in Beneficial 
concluded: 
It approaches the incredible for us to conclude from the evidence in 
the instant case that the public relations men, in their constant and 
prolonged communications with Hanley, were engaging in indepen-
dent endeavors. The inference is obvious that their concerted ac-
tivities along the lines outlined in our summary of the facts could 
not have been carried on without the knowledge or at least the 
reckless toleration of highly placed corporate executives.56 (emphasis 
added) . 
Why then was the Model Penal Code standard rejected? The Court 
apparently feared that under the Code standard the title or position of 
an individual would be "conclusively determinative" in ascribing criminal 
responsibility to a corporation.57 The Court stated that the Code standard 
does not adequately deal with the evidentiary problems inherent in estab-
lishing the quantum of proof necessary to show that the directors or 
officers of a corporation authorize, ratify, tolerate or participate in the 
criminal acts of an agent.58 Noting that the size and complexity of many 
large corporations necessitates the delegation of more authority to lesser 
corporate agents and employees,59 the Court declared: "We believe that 
stringent standards must be adopted to discourage any attempt by 'en-
docratic'60 corporations' executives to place the sole responsibility for 
criminal acts on the shoulders of their subordinates. "61 
This reasoning is subject to criticism. Although a corporation's execu-
tives may be indirectly affected by the imposition of criminal sanctions 
on a corporation, the burden of the criminal sanction, as well as any 
financial losses suffered by the corporation as a result of adverse publicity, 
falls upon the stockholders whose control over "endocratic" corporations 
is by definition minimal. Furthermore, a requirement that in the proseou-
tion of a corporation for a serious crime the state must establish reckless 
toleration by a high managerial agent would not appear to be unduly 
burdensome. 
The Court also stated the factors which may be considered in applying 
the standard set out in Beneficial. The extent of control and authority 
exercised by the individual over and within the corporation is an im-
portant factor and, in the case of small closely held corporations, might 
56 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1441, 275 N.E.2d at 83. 
57 Id. at 1440, 275 N.E.2d at 83. 
58 Id. at 1439, 275 N.E.2d at 82. 
59 Id. at 1440, 275 N.E.2d at 83. 
60 The term "endocratic" means a large publicly-held corporation whose stock 
is scattered in small fractions among thousands of stockholders. Id. at 1442 n.58, 
275 N.E.2d at 84. 
61 Id. at 1442, 275 N.E.2d at 84. 
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be considered decisive.62 Secondly, the extent and manner to which cor-
porate funds were used in the crime may be considered. In Beneficial 
the Court attached significance to the fact that in order to commit the 
crimes charged the individual defendants either had to offer to pay 
money to a public official or conspire to do so. The disbursal of cor-
porate funds is an act peculiarly within the ambit of corporate activity.63 
Thirdly, a repeated pattern of criminal conduct tending to indicate cor-
porate toleration or ratification of the agent's acts may be considered. 
The Court's holding that the quantum of proof necessary to sustain 
the conviction of a corporation is sufficiently met if it is shown that the 
agent has enough authority to act for the corporation in the particular 
sphere of corporate business in which he was engaged at the time he 
committed the criminal act does not preclude the imposition of strict 
liability on corporations whose agents commit criminal acts on their be-
half. However, the Court's statement that the jury was entitled to con-
sider the above factors in applying the standard indicates that it does 
not contemplate a mechanical application of the test and that some-
thing more than the mere fact of agency should be required for the im-
position of criminal liability on a corporation. It is not clear just what 
else is required. The Court stated that the above factors were some of 
the factors entitled to be considered and cautioned that they were not in 
themselves decisive,64 but again it did not actually require that there be 
proof of anything beyond the agent's authority to act for the corporation 
within that particular sphere of corporate business in which the criminal 
act was committed. It would appear that corporate criminal liability will 
be determined in the future on a case-by-case basis. 
The Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts includes a provision 
entitled "Criminal Liability of Corporations and Business Trusts."65 That 
provision imposes essentially the same standard of corporate criminal 
liability as the Model Penal Code. Under the Proposed Code a corpora-
tion may be convicted of any offense committed in furtherance of its 
affairs on the basis of conduct performed, authorized, requested, com-
manded or recklessly tolerated by a managerial agent acting within the 
scope of his employment. Despite the omission of the word "high", the 
definition of "managerial agent" in the Proposed Code is identical to 
the definition of "high managerial agent" in the Model Penal Code. The 
word "high" was probably omitted to ensure that the criteria defining 
that term will be construed to include agents of endocratic corporations 
who have extensive authority over the everyday operation of the cor-
poration. Such an interpretation would remove the Court's major objec-
tion to the Model Penal Code by lessening the evidentiary problems in-
herent in proving corporate participation in crime. 
62 Id. at 1445 n.62, 275 N.E.2d at 86. 
63 Id. at 1439, 275 N.E.2d at 82. 
64 Id. at 1445, 275 N.E.2d at 86. 
65 Senate Bill 200 (1972), c. 263 §22. 
31
Gaberman: Chapter 4: Partnerships and Corporations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
92 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §4.11 
Asswning that the defendants in Beneficial would not have been in a 
better position under the Model Penal Code standard, application of the 
Proposed Criminal Code to the facts of that case would not have affected 
the end result. However, adoption of the Proposed Code would establish 
the "superior agent" rule as the test of corporate criminal liability in 
Massachusetts and would thus preclude mechanical application of the 
Beneficial test. 
DIANE M. KOTrMYER 
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